AUDIT FIRM REPUTATION, AUDITOR SWITCHES, AND CLIENT STOCK PRICE REACTIONS: THE ANDERSEN EXPERIENCE by Sharad Asthana et al.
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO, COLLEGE OF BUSINESS 
Working Paper SERIES 
     
     0024ACC-501-2007 
 










AUDIT FIRM REPUTATION, AUDITOR SWITCHES, AND CLIENT STOCK PRICE 
REACTIONS: THE ANDERSEN EXPERIENCE 
Sharad Asthana 
Department of Accounting 
College of Business 
The University of Texas at San Antonio 
One UTSA Circle 





Department of Accounting 
Fox School of Business and Management 
13th and Montgomery Streets 
Speakman Hall (006-00) 





Department of Accounting 
Fox School of Business and Management 
13th and Montgomery Streets 
Speakman Hall (006-00) 




Department of Accounting, 
University of Texas at San Antonio 
San Antonio, TX 78249, U.S.A 
Copyright ©2006 by the UTSA College of Business. All rights reserved.  This document can be downloaded 
without charge for educational purposes from the UTSA College of Business Working Paper Series 
(business.utsa.edu/wp) without explicit permission, provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to 
the source.  The views expressed are those of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect official 
positions of UTSA, the College of Business, or any individual department. 
ONE UTSA CIRCLE    
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS  78249-0631        
210 458-4317  |  BUSINESS.UTSA.EDU AUDIT FIRM REPUTATION, AUDITOR SWITCHES, AND CLIENT STOCK PRICE 





Sharad C. Asthana 
Department of Accounting 
College of Business 
University of Texas at San Antonio 
One UTSA Circle 
San Antonio, TX, USA 78249 
sharad,asthana@utsa.edu 





Department of Accounting 
Fox School of Business and Management 
13
th and Montgomery Streets 
Speakman Hall (006 00) 
Philadelphia, PA 19122 
drb@temple.edu 





Department of Accounting 
Fox School of Business and Management 
13
th and Montgomery Streets 
Speakman Hall (006 00) 
Philadelphia, PA 19122 
krish@temple.edu 








December 2007  
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The financial scandal surrounding the collapse of Enron caused erosion in the reputation of its 
auditor, Andersen, leading to concerns about Andersen’s ability to continue in existence and 
ultimately its demise. In this paper we investigate the timing of switch by former Andersen’s 
clients. We find that the timing of the switch is related to variables hypothesized to be 
associated with the cost of switch. Specifically these are client size, auditor industry 
specialization, provision of non audit services, auditor tenure, quality of earnings and financial 
distress In addition we find that clients with the greatest market losses attributable to 
disclosures pertaining to Andersen’s audit of Enron, and strongest corporate governance were 
more likely to switch early, while those with the strongest ties to Andersen were more likely to 
delay switching. We also find that clients switching from Andersen experienced positive 
abnormal returns during the three day window surrounding the announcement. Importantly we 
find this positive return to be greater for clients with greater prior losses. 
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AUDIT FIRM REPUTATION, AUDITOR SWITCHES, AND CLIENT STOCK PRICE 
REACTIONS: THE ANDERSEN EXPERIENCE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The financial collapse of Enron Corporation during the last quarter of 2001 drew 
extensive attention to its auditor, Arthur Andersen, from the media, regulators, and the 
accounting profession. Following its indictment in March 2002, its clients began changing 
auditors en mass. Andersen was convicted on June 15, 2002 and discontinued its operations soon 
after, forcing its remaining clients to seek a new audit firm. Unlike a voluntary auditor change 
where the change is motivated by client cost benefit considerations, for Andersen clients the 
change was involuntary and driven by an exogenous shock (Barton 2005).  In this paper we 
examine the factors associated with the timing of the switch away from Andersen.  Following 
related research, we argue that net switching costs and loss of wealth suffered by former 
Andersen clients as factors influencing the timing of auditor changes.  
We model switching costs as a function of client size, auditor industry specialization, 
provision of non audit services, auditor tenure, quality of earnings and financial distress. Our 
results suggest that these factors are positively associated with the time taken to find a new 
auditor. In addition, we find that clients that suffered significant market losses when revelations 
about Enron occurred are more likely to switch early compared to other clients.
1 
Next, we examine the valuation effects surrounding the auditor changes. Prior research 
has argued that auditor reputation adds credibility to the client’s financial statements (Simunic 
and Stein 1987; Francis and Wilson 1988), and is therefore impounded in the client’s stock price 
                                                 
1 Barton (2005) examines the factors associated with the timing of auditor change by Andersen clients. He provides 
evidence that Andersen clients with “large press coverage, analyst following, institutional ownership, and cash 
proceeds from recent external financing” changed auditors sooner. We extend Barton (2005) by examining whether 
the quality of corporate governance and the degree of loyalty to Andersen affected the decision the switch. Blouin et 
al. (2007) also provide evidence that net switching costs distinguishes between clients that go with the former audit 
partner and those that change to a new audit firm. Their sample is confined to only those (n=407) for which 
information about auditor identity is available. We use a much larger population of firms in our study.   2
(e.g., Beatty 1989; Baber et al. 1995). It follows that, if Andersen lost credibility due to the 
disclosures surrounding Enron, its clients would suffer a loss in market value, and subsequently 
recover some of the losses when they move to an auditor with a better reputation. Recent studies 
have shown (Chaney and Philipich 2002; Callen and Morel 2003; Doogar et al. 2003), and our 
tests confirm, that Andersen clients lost significant market value during the periods of key 
negative disclosures about Andersen. To investigate the recovery of firm value, we examine the 
market reaction to the 937 auditor change announcements made by former Andersen clients. We 
find the market reaction to the change announcement was positive on average, and higher for 
clients that were more adversely affected, in terms of market price, to the earlier disclosures 
pertaining to Andersen’s audit of Enron. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section contains motivation and hypotheses 
development. Section 3 discusses the data, research design and empirical results. Section 4 
contains our conclusions. 
 
MOTIVATION AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Decision to Change Auditors 
  The disclosures about Andersen caused a decline in its reputation and Andersen clients 
suffered significant loss of market value (Chaney and Philipich 2002). From February 2002 to 
June 2002, Andersen faced a civil investigation by the SEC, several lawsuits, and was indicted 
and tried by the Justice Department for, and ultimately found guilty of, obstruction of justice. 
During this period, disclosures began to appear in the media about Andersen clients changing   3
auditors.
2 The circumstances surrounding Andersen’s demise are unique in that within a short 
period of time all of their clients had to select a new auditor.  
  The timing of the decision to change auditors would depend on the net cost associated 
with switching to a new auditor and the extent to which they suffered due to Andersen’s loss of 
reputation. We conjecture that clients with low switching costs and those with greatest losses in 
response to the disclosures pertaining to Andersen’s audit of Enron would be the first to change 
auditors because of the incentives associated with the switch. Our hypothesis (stated in 
alternative form) is:  
H1a: Andersen clients with lower net switching costs were more likely to switch 
early. 
 
H1b: Andersen clients with the greatest losses in response to the disclosures 
pertaining to Andersen’s audit of Enron were more likely to switch early.  
 
 
Stock Price Reactions to Auditor Switching away from Andersen 
  We next investigate the stock price reaction to auditor change announcements. In general, 
prior research has not found a significant abnormal return for auditor change announcements 
(Schwartz and Soo 1996a; Nichols and Smith 1983), except for auditor resignations (e.g., Shu 
2000). However, we expect that, investors would react positively to the move away from 
Andersen an auditor with a damaged reputation. Therefore, we test the following hypothesis: 
H2: Andersen clients that publicly disclosed they were changing auditors 
experienced positive stock price reactions around the announcement date. 
                                                 
2 For example, on January 29, 2002 the Wall Street Journal reported that Delta Airlines was considering changing its 
auditor. The same article also reported that “several other large companies are now reviewing their relationship with 
Andersen” (Brannigan and Opdyke 2002).   4
 
DATA, RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Sample Selection 
We started with 9,861 firms on the 2001 Annual Compustat Tape (PST and Full 
Coverage). We obtained financial data and auditor identity from Compustat and stock returns 
from CRSP. We hand collected corporate governance and employee affiliation information 
(described later) from proxy and 10 K filings, and ownership data from Compact Disclosure. We 
obtained audit and non audit fee data from Standard & Poors and proxy filings. As described in 
table 1 (panel A), we lost 2,561 firms for which returns for the test windows are not available on 
CRSP.  Another 1,321 firms were lost because either the identity of the auditor and/or other 
required data was missing from Compustat. Finally we dropped 4,045 firms audited by other Big 
4 auditors and 997 audited by non Big 4 auditors, leaving us with a sample of 937 clients audited 
by Andersen.  
[insert table 1 about here] 
Panel B provides information on the timing of the auditor switch, during the period 
February 6, 2002 to October 31, 2002, which we manually obtained from 8 K filings at the SEC 
website. For clarity, we break up the window by easily identifiable events beginning with the 
release of the Powers report on February 2, 2002. From the date of the Powers report to the date 
of Andersen’s indictment only 15 of Andersen’s 937 clients switched audit firms. The relatively 
few changes may reflect the fact that clients had not yet realized that Andersen would be unable 
to continue in existence, and/or the fact that they were unwilling to drop their auditor in the midst 
of their year end audit.
3  Switches accelerated dramatically after the indictment when it became 
                                                 
3 About two thirds of Andersen’s clients had December 31
st fiscal year ends and consequently their audit would still 
be going on during this window.   5
clear that Andersen would be unable to continue and finding a new auditor was inevitable. 261 
clients switched between the indictment on March 14 and May 6, the date the trial started, while 
more than half of Andersen’s remaining clients (359) announced their switch during the trial.  Of 
the 937 changes, slightly more than two thirds (635) occurred prior to Andersen’s conviction on 
June 15, 2002. Almost immediately following the verdict Andersen announced that it would no 
longer audit public companies (Eichenwald 2002). While the vast majority of these changes were 
auditor dismissals, there were 13 auditor resignations. Panel C of table 1 provides descriptive 
information about the industry distribution of Andersen’s clients. Table 2 contains definitions of 
all variables used in our analyses.  
[insert table 2 about here] 
  In table 3, we present market reaction to several negative disclosures about Andersen. 
Although this is not the main focus of our paper, we do this to establish comparability with 
recent work (e.g., Chaney and Philipich 2002). We estimate losses in value for five dates by 
computing the mean cumulative abnormal returns during the three day window ( 1,1) 
surrounding the date. We also examine cumulative abnormal returns for the 13 month window 
from October 1, 2001 to October 31, 2002.
4  Daily abnormal returns are computed using the 
four factor Carhart (1997) model. 
[insert table 3 about here] 
The magnitude of the abnormal return in the short windows is significantly different from 
zero in all five short windows. We see that the return to Andersen clients in the period 
surrounding the shredding disclosure are significantly negative,  0.46 percent for our sample of 
                                                 
4 We deliberately end the window on October 31, 2002 to allow for all of Andersen’s clients to announce their 
switches.   6
937 firms.
5  The return associated with the disclosure of the Powers report is significantly 
negative,  0.67 percent, while that associated with Andersen’s indictment,  0.21 percent.
6 Using 
a reduced sample of clients that had not yet announced an auditor change, we find additional 
significant negative abnormal return of  0.54 percent around the start of Andersen’s criminal 
trial, and  0.23 percent around Andersen’s conviction date, both statistically different from zero.
7 
Examining the full 13 month window, which encompasses the first doubts about the assurance 
value of Andersen’s audit, Andersen’s downfall, and the clients switch from Andersen, we find a 
significant negative abnormal return of  5.19 percent. 
Timing of Switch 
We now examine (hypotheses H1a and H1b) whether clients with lower net switching 
costs and greater losses related to the disclosures pertaining to Andersen’s audit of Enron 
switched relatively early. We conduct using ordinary least squares, ordinal and multinomial 
logit. We present the OLS model below. The logistical analyses differ only in the dependent 
variable. For example in the dichotomous model, the dependent variable is coded 0 if the client 
switches from Andersen between 2/5/2002 and 6/15/2002 (i.e., the preconviction period), and 1 
if it switches after 6/15/2002 (the post conviction period); while in the trichotomous model the 
                                                 
5 Our mean CAR, while statistically significant is smaller in magnitude, i.e., less negative, than that found in Chaney 
and Philipich (2002), who found abnormal returns of  1.32 percent for their smaller sample of 284 firms.
  To a large 
extent we feel the difference between the two samples is driven by the difference in sample. That is, while the 
average firm in our sample has a market value of slightly more than $1.7 billion, the average firm in Chaney and 
Philipich’s is thrice that size, with a market value of almost $5 billion.  
6 Chaney and Philipich (2002) found insignificant abnormal returns on the indictment date. 
7 Krishnan (2005) provides evidence consistent with “aggressive accounting practices” by Andersen’s Houston 
clients. In untabulated analysis we examine whether these abnormal returns are affected by whether the client was 
audited by Andersen’s Houston office and whether the client operated in the same industry as Enron. For example, 
we find that in the January 10
 window the abnormal returns were   1.77 percent for firms operating in Enron’s 
industries and  0.40percent for all other Andersen clients. While both returns were significantly less than zero, the 
results indicate a strong and significant industry effect. Comparable differences were also observed for the February 
4 window. Similarly we found for the January 10 window the abnormal returns for clients of Andersen’s Houston 
office were much more negative  2.48 percent) than for Andersen’s non Houston clients  0.36 percent). While both 
returns were significantly less than zero, the results show a strong and significant Houston effect. A comparable 
Houston effect is observed for the May 6 window. No significant industry or Houston effects are detected for the 
other windows.   7
dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the client switches from Andersen from 2/5/2002 to  
5/6/2002 (the pretrial period); value of 2 if it switches from 5/7/2002 to 6/15/2002 (the trial 
period); and value of 3 if it switches after 6/15/2002 (the post conviction period).  
DELAY = β0 + β1 LMV + β2 INDSPL + β3 NONAUDIT + β4 DTENURE + β5ADACCR + 
β6DISTRESS + β7PREVCAR1 + β8PREVCAR2 + β9SEPARATECHAIR + β10BDIR + 
β11ACDIR +  β12 BMEET +  β13 ACMEET+ β14 EXPERT + β15 DFYR + β16 ROA + β17 
DNEWB4 +  ε                   (1) 
 
where DELAY  is the number of days after February 6, 2002 the client announced its switch from 
Andersen.  
Proxies for Switching Costs 
  LMV, INDSPL, NONAUDIT, DTENURE, ADACCR, and DISTRESS are all proxies for 
switching costs and are used to test H1a. LMV is the log of the market value of equity. Our 
expectation is that larger firms may incur greater switching costs, as ex ante they have less of a 
choice, i.e., they have to stay with the Big 4. Alternatively the larger firms may be viewed as 
prestige clients and may be aggressively sought after by the remaining Big 4 and thus their 
switching costs may be lower. Consequently we do not make a prediction on this variable. 
INDSPL is industry specialization, which is measured as the Andersen’s market share, based on 
the square root of clients’ total assets (Ettredge and Greenberg 1990), in the firm’s two digit SIC 
code.
8 Our expectation is that switching costs will be higher and that firms will delay switching 
the greater Andersen’s expertise in their industry. NONAUDIT (following Frankel et al. 2002; 
Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Reynolds et al. 2004) is the ratio of nonaudit fees to total fees paid to 
Andersen.
9 Our expectation is that the more non audit services provided by Andersen, which by 
definition, are less of a commodity than audit services, the greater the switching costs.  
                                                 
8 Our results are similar when market share is calculated on the basis of sales and total assets. 
9 We also performed a sensitivity test by using the ratio of total client fees to total auditor fees in place of non audit 
fees. Our results are qualitatively similar.   8
DTENURE (following Myers et al. 2003) is an indicator variable taking the value of one if 
Andersen had been the auditor for five or more years and zero otherwise.
10  Our expectation is 
the longer Andersen’s tenure as auditor, the greater the switching costs. ADACCR is the absolute 
value of 2001 discretionary accruals deflated by total assets, calculated using the cross sectional 
version of the Jones (1991) model as in DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and we use the difference 
between net income and cash from operations as our measure of total accruals (Hribar and 
Collins 2002).  Our expectation is that higher discretionary accruals, which imply lower earnings 
quality, will increase switching costs.  Lastly, DISTRESS is an indicator variable taking the value 
of 1 if the Altman Z score is less than 1.81 and zero otherwise.  Our expectation is that firms 
with a greater probability of bankruptcy will be less desirable as clients and thus will have higher 
switching costs.  
Proxies for Prior Losses due to Andersen’s Loss of Reputation 
  PREVCAR1 and PREVCAR2, which are the cumulative four factor adjusted abnormal 
returns from the Carhart (1997) model for the ( 1, 1) windows around Andersen’s admission of 
shredding of documents on January 10, 2002 and the release of Powers Report on February 2, 
2002 respectively, are our test variables for hypothesis H1b. We use these events as prior 
literature (e.g., Chaney and Philipich 2002) shows a significant market reaction by Andersen 
clients during these windows. Our expectation is that the greater the loss in firm value to these 
events the quicker the firm will switch from Andersen. 
Control Variables  
   Since Enron was about more than a breakdown in the audit process, also about a 
breakdown in the governance process we examine a series of variables suggested by prior 
research to proxy for good governance which may be used to mitigate the impact of Andersen’s 
                                                 
10 Our results reported later are qualitatively unchanged when 3, 7, and 9 years are used as cutoffs instead of 5 years.   9
loss of reputation and accelerate the switch from Andersen  We use several proxies for corporate 
governance based on prior work (Raghunandan et al. 2001; Raghunandan and Rama 2003; Xie et 
al. 2003; Bedard et al. 2004):  SEPARATECHAIR, BDIR, ACDIR, BMEET,  ACMEET, and 
EXPERT. SEPARATECHAIR a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the position of CEO 
and Chairman of the Board are separated, and 0 otherwise; BDIR the number of directors on the 
board; ACDIR is the number of directors on the audit committee; BMEET the number of board 
meetings; ACMEET the number of audit committee meetings; and EXPERT the number of 
financial experts on the audit committee.
11 In general, a larger value for the variable is associated 
with better governance. Thus, we predict a negative association between these variables and the 
delay in switching from Andersen. 
We also include the following control variables that might influence the time 
taken to switch auditors:  ROA, DNEWB4, and DFYR. We include ROA (return on assets) 
as we feel the better the firm performance the easier it will have finding a successor 
auditor, i.e., it will be more desirable.  Hence we predict a negative association between 
delay and ROA. We include DNEWB4 (coded as one if the new auditor is a Big 4 auditor, 
zero otherwise) because the timing of the change may depend on the kind of successor 
auditor the client is looking for (Schwartz and Soo 1996b). In particular, if Big 4 auditors 
are more conservative in their acceptance of clients in the wake of Andersen’s problems, 
it may take longer for the client to obtain a new auditor. On the other hand, familiarity 
with a Big 4 auditor and the services it provides may make it easier to replace Andersen 
with another Big 4 auditor. Finally we include DFYR a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the client’s fiscal year end is December, and 0 otherwise to control for the 
                                                 
11 To identify the financial experts on audit committees, we use the definition of “accounting financial expertise” in 
DeFond et al. (2005) which is similar to that suggested in SEC (2002).   10
possibility that clients are less likely to make an auditor change in the midst of their year 
end audit.  Consequently these clients would be unable to change during the months of 
February and March, and hence would be more likely to be late switchers.
12 
  Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the variables in our model. Beginning with our 
switching cost variables we find  that firms that switch early are larger, i.e., LMV is greater 
(p<0.01), are less likely to belong to industries where Andersen was a specialist (p<0.01),  
obtained fewer non audit services from Andersen (p<0.01), and were less likely to be with 
Andersen for five years (p<0.10).  Overall it appears that early switchers have lower switching 
costs. We do not observe, at least in the univariate sense, any difference between early and late 
switchers for either the quality of earnings or the probability of financial distress. While we find 
early switchers had suffered greater losses due to the disclosures pertaining to Andersen, those 
differences are only marginally significant (p<0.10) and only for second of the windows. We 
also find some differences in our control variables between early and late switchers.  In general 
early switchers appear to have better governance, as the number of directors (BDIR), and number 
of audit committee members (ACDIR), as well as number of meetings for both groups (BMEET 
and ACMEET) are greater for early adopters. We also find early switchers are more likely to 
have a separate board chair. However, we do not find a difference for EXPERT. We also find that 
early switchers have a better, albeit less negative, ROA, are less likely to have a Big 4 auditor, 
and are less likely to have December fiscal year ends.  
[insert table 4 about here] 
                                                 
12  During our sample period the 10 K had to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission within 90 days 
after the end of the fiscal year. Hence if the fiscal year end was December 31, the 10 K must be filed by March 31
st. 
Prior research, e.g., Easton and Zmijewski (1993), finds that most firms file close to that deadline.    11
Table 5 provides a correlation matrix for the variables used in our analysis.  In general 
the correlations between the variables are low, i.e., the highest is 0.4519, indicating that 
multicollinearity is not a problem.  
[insert table 5 about here]Table 6, provides the regression results for equation (1). The 
first regression in the table examines switches during the “voluntary” period and uses the 
continuous variable DELAY as the dependent variable. We also incorporate involuntary switches 
using two discrete specifications to capture delay. In the second regression, the dependent 
variable is DELAY2, a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 if the switch occurs prior to 
Andersen’s conviction on June 15, 2002, and 1 otherwise. In the third regression the dependent 
variable DELAY3 takes the value of 1 if the switch occurs prior to the start of the trial on May 6, 
2002, 2 if the switch occurs after the start of the trial but prior to the conviction on June 15, and 3 
if the switch occurs after the conviction. Thus the second and third regressions are estimated as 
binomial logit and ordered logit respectively. We selected these two cut offs because the 
beginning of the trial significantly diminished the possibility of a settlement with the Justice 
Department (Beltran 2002) and the conviction of Andersen on June 15 marked the end of 
Andersen’s auditing operations.  
[insert table 6 about here] 
  In general, the tenor of the results is consistent across the models. Beginning with our 
switching cost variables we find that firm size, LMV, is negative and strongly significant in the 
OLS and ordered logits. INDSPL is positive and significant in all models indicating that firms in 
industries where Andersen was a specialist were more likely to delay switching. In contrast, 
NONAUDIT is only significant in the OLS model. DTENURE is positive and significant in the 
OLS and ordinal logit models, providing some evidence that the delay is related to Andersen’s   12
tenure as auditor.
13  ADACCR and DISTRESS are both positive and significant in the OLS and 
ordered logits, consistent with firms that have lower earnings quality and firms in financial 
distress taking longer to switch. Overall the results support H1A, suggesting that switching costs 
played a role in the timing of the switch. After controlling for other factors, PREVCAR2 is 
significantly positive in the OLS and ordered logits, indicating that clients that had smaller 
(greater) losses during disclosures pertaining to Andersen’s audit of Enron were less (more) 
likely to switch early.  
  There is also evidence that the quality of corporate governance played a role in 
determining the timing of auditor change. Among the variables measuring the quality of 
corporate governance, the number of board members (BDIR), the number of board and audit 
committee meetings (BMEET and ACMEET), and CEO separatechair (SEPARATECHAIR) are 
negatively associated with delay (as predicted) in the OLS and ordered logits. The number of 
financial experts on the audit committee (EXPERT) are significantly negative in OLS and two 
level ordered logit, while the number of directors on the audit committee is significantly negative 
in the three level ordered logit. Overall the evidence suggests that clients with better governance 
switched earlier. 
  Results also show that clients who performed better in terms of ROA switched 
earlier and that those that required the services of a Big 4 auditor (DNEWB4) tended to switch 
later. Finally the coefficient on DFYR is positive and significant, which is consistent with clients 
with December fiscal year ends having to delay their search for a successor auditor/switch until 
                                                 
13 To rule out the possibility that the tenure variable may be confounded by age of the company, we re estimated the 
models after adding an additional variable, AGE, measured as the number of years the company has been publicly 
traded. The TENURE variable continues to be significant.   13
the completion of their year end audit and hence being unable to switch during February and 
March.
14   
During the sample period, clients could be leaving Andersen initially due to reputation 
loss and later due to auditor failure risk. This could lead to changes in the coefficients over time. 
To test this notion, we run the CATMOD procedure in SAS that directly fits the generalized logit 
model. For the three period dependent variable (PERIOD3), the first column of the multinomial 
logit reports the ratio of period 1 to period 3 and the second column the ratio of period 2 to 
period 3. Thus, in the first column of the multinomial logit, an insignificant coefficient implies 
that p1 is not different from p3; a positive (negative) implies that p1 is greater (less) than p3. 
Positive coefficients on LMV, INDSPL, BDIR, ACMEET, and DFYR  imply that these variables 
lose explanatory power as time passes The remaining variables are insignificant. 
Market Reaction to Switching 
  Next we look at the cumulative four factor adjusted Carhart (1997) abnormal 
return (CAR) for the three day window ( 1, 1) surrounding the auditor change 
announcement to test hypothesis H4. To examine the factors that influence the return we 
use the following cross sectional regression:  
CAR = β0 + β1 LMV + β2 INDSPL + β3 NONAUDIT + β4 DTENURE + β5ADACCR + 
β6DISTRESS + β7PREVCAR1 + β8PREVCAR2 + β9SEPARATECHAIR + β10BDIR + 
β11ACDIR +  β12 BMEET +  β13 ACMEET+ β14 EXPERT + β15 DFYR + β16 ROA + β17 
DNEWB4 +  ε                   (2) 
 
where all the variables are as defined above.
15 Hypothesis H2 predicts a negative sign for 
PREVCAR1 and PREVCAR2, i.e., the larger the prior negative return the larger the positive 
return to the switch announcement. 
                                                 
14 The results are unchanged if we redefine DFYR as including all fiscal years ending in November, December, and 
January.   14
  Table 7, Panel A shows that the average abnormal return around the date of 
announcement by an Andersen client that it was dismissing its auditor was positive and 
significant – the mean cumulative abnormal return was 0.51 percent for the three day window, 
which corresponds to $7 million increase in market value.
16,17 Panel B contains the regression 
results for equation (2). While the coefficient on PREVCAR1 is insignificantly different from 
zero, the negative coefficient on PREVCAR2 is consistent with announcements by former clients 
of Andersen being viewed more positively for those clients that suffered greater losses to the 
earlier disclosures pertaining to Andersen’s audit of Enron. 
 
  [insert table 7 about here] 
Turning to our other variables, we see little association with abnormal returns to 
switching. Of our switching cost variables we see positive and significant associations with 
auditor tenure (DTENURE) and earnings quality (ADACCR), indicating that the switch was 
viewed more favorably when Andersen’s tenure with the client was high and earnings quality 
was poor. In contrast we find negative and significant associations for two of our governance 
variables, the number of board meetings (BMEET) and the number of financial experts on the 
board (EXPERT).  We also find a negative and significant coefficient on ROA and a positive and 
significant coefficient for December fiscal year end companies (DFYR).    
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 We manually check newswires and major newspapers for the ten day period ( 7, 2) around the 8 K filing date for 
concurrent disclosures.  We identify 290 such cases out of the sample of 937 firms. As a sensitivity check, we rerun 
our tests after deleting these 290 firms. Our conclusions are unchanged. 
16 As discussed above, switches, especially the later ones, were probably anticipated by investors. One example is 
Delta Airlines, whose actual switch in March, was predated by several weeks of discussion in the financial press. 
Consequently the returns observed in reaction to the switch announcement do not reflect the full benefit of the 
switch. 
17 In untabulated analysis we find that a comparable announcement by a non Andersen client during our sample 
period was met by an insignificant negative market reaction and that the difference in return between Andersen and 
non Andersen changes was positive and significant.   15
CONCLUSIONS 
Prior research has hypothesized that an auditor’s reputation influences clients’ choice of 
auditors and is impounded in the stock price of its clients. We examine the effect of Andersen’s 
loss of reputation on the speed of auditor change by its clients, and on firm valuation surrounding 
the time of the auditor changes.  Over the months following the negative disclosures about the 
audit of Enron in 2001, Andersen’s clients began to switch auditors, the majority doing so before 
June 15, 2002 when Andersen was convicted and its remaining clients were forced to change 
auditors. We expect that the loss in Andersen’s reputation would cause clients to change 
auditors, particularly those that had the greatest previous loss in value, and those with the best 
corporate governance. In contrast we expect that clients with the highest switching costs would 
take longer to find a new auditor. Our findings reflect these expectations. We find that clients 
with the greatest stock price drop in response to the disclosures pertaining to Andersen’s audit of 
Enron, and clients with better corporate governance were more likely to switch early, whereas 
those with higher switching costs were more likely to delay switching.  
We also examine market reaction to subsequent auditor change announcements by 
voluntary changers. We expect that the change would cause a positive reaction as firms move 
from a less to a more reputable auditor. We find this to be the case. For the voluntary changers, 
we find that the mean cumulative abnormal return during a three day window surrounding the 
date of announcement of auditor change was positive and statistically significant.  
Our findings add to our understanding of the effects of auditor reputation on the market 
valuation of their clients. Previous studies provide evidence that a loss of auditor reputation is 
associated with a loss in client firm value. This evidence of an association between auditor 
reputation and client value could be further bolstered if these losses are recovered when the   16
clients move to another auditor. Because auditor changes generally occur for many reasons, it is 
difficult to isolate situations where the change reflects a change in auditor reputation. Changes in 
auditor type (Big 8/6/5 non Big 8/6/5 and vice versa) can broadly be viewed as changes in 
auditor reputation, but studies that examine market reactions for such changes do not document 
significant positive reactions to a change from a non Big 8 auditor to a Big 8 auditor (e.g., 
Nichols and Smith 1983). This is likely because the change in auditor reputation was confounded 
by a number of other factors that accompanied the change. By examining the Enron Andersen 
context, we are able to focus on auditor changes that involve moves from what is clearly an 
auditor who has lost reputation to one with a relatively unharmed reputation. The finding that the 
market reacts positively to changes away from Andersen therefore provides further support for 
studies that document a positive association between firm value and auditor reputation.   17
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection and Distribution 
   
Panel A: Sample Selection  




of Firms  
Firms available on 2001 Annual COMPUSTAT Tape (PST and 
Full Coverage) 
9,861 
  Returns not available on 2002 CRSP tape  (2,561) 
     7,300  
  Either the identity of the auditor or other required 
data is not available on COMPUSTAT 
(1,321) 
  Big 4 Auditor  (4,045)
 
  Non Big 4 Auditor  (997) 
  Andersen clients  937 
 
Panel B: Distribution of Switching Firms by Delay  
 





















Powers Report is released 
 
Federal Govt. indicts Andersen 
 
Andersen’s criminal trial begins 
 
Andersen found guilty 
 





























† Since the Powers report was released on 2/2/2002 (Saturday), the event date for our 
abnormal return analysis is 2/4/2002 and our ( 1, 1) event window ends on 2/5/2002. 
Consequently we begin our analysis of switches on 2/6/2002.  Note that the first switch 
we record is on 2/12/2002.     22
TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
 
Panel C: Distribution of Switching Firms across Industries 
 
Industry  Clients 
1.  Agriculture, Forestry,  and Fishing   
2.   Mining           
3.   Construction         
4.   Manufacturing         
5.   Transportation and Utilities 
6.    Wholesale         
7.    Retail           
8.    Financial Services       
9.    Services   











Total  937 
 
  
The industry classification is based on Dopuch et al. (1987), and includes the following 
SIC codes: 
 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing  100 999 
Mining          1000 1499 
Construction        1500 1999 
Manufacturing       2000 3999 
Transportation and Utilities    4000 4999 
Wholesale        5000 5199 
Retail          5200 5999 
Financial Services      6000 6999 
Services        7000 8999 




Variables    Definition 
ACDIR  Number of Directors on the Audit Committee 
ACMEET  Number of Audit Committee meetings 
ADACCR  Absolute value of discretionary accruals deflated by total assets during 
fiscal year 2001, calculated using the cross sectional version of the Jones 
[1991] model as in DeFond and Jiambalvo [1994] and we use the 
difference between net income and cash from operations as our measure 
of total accruals (Hribar and Collins 2002). 
BDIR  Number of Directors on the Board  
BMEET  Number of Board meetings 
CAR 
 
Cumulative four factor adjusted Carhart returns of clients for the window  
( 1, 1) around the respective event date. 
DELAY   Number of days after February 6, 2002 the client switched from 
Andersen. 
DFYR  Dummy variable with the value of 1 if fiscal year end is December, and 0 
otherwise. 
DISTRESS  Dummy variable that has a value of 1 if Altman’s Z score (for fiscal year 
2001) is less than 1.81, and 0 otherwise. 
DNEWB4  Dummy variable with the value of 1 if the new auditor is one of the Big 4, 
and 0 otherwise. 
DTENURE  Dichotomous variable with value of 1 if total years with Andersen as 
auditor are five or more, and 0 otherwise 
EXPERT  Number of Audit Committee members that are financial experts. 
INDSPL  Measure of industry specialization of the auditor; measured as the 
auditor’s market share (based on the square root of clients’ total assets) 
during fiscal year 2001 in the 2 digit SIC code 
LMV  Natural logarithm of market value of equity (in millions) at the end of 
fiscal year 2001. 
NONAUDIT  Proportion of nonaudit fees (includes tax, system, and other services) to 
total fees paid to the auditor. 
SEPARATECHAIR  Dummy variable with the value of 1 if positions of CEO and chairman of 
the board are separated, and 0 otherwise.  
PERIOD2  Dichotomous variable with value of 0 if client switches from Andersen 
between 2/5/2002 and 6/15/2002; 1 if it switches after 6/15/2002. 
PERIOD3  Trichotomous variable with value of 1 if client switches from Andersen 
between 2/5/2002 and 5/6/2002; value of 2 if it switches between 
5/6/2002 and 6/15/2002; and value of 3 if it switches after 6/15/2002. 
PREVCAR1 & 
PREVCAR2 
Cumulative four factor adjusted Carhart returns in ( 1, 1) windows around 
two previous events: Andersen’s admission of shredding of documents on 
1/10/2002 and release of Powers Report on 2/2/2002. 
ROA  Return on assets during fiscal year 2001.   24
 TABLE 3 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 








































Oct 2001 to 
Oct 2002 
Andersen admits to 
shredding thousands of 
Enron related documents. 
The Department of Justice 
announces a criminal 
investigation of Andersen.  
 
Powers Report, suggesting 
Andersen’s headquarter 
office in Chicago was aware 
of problems with Houston 
office and Enron audit, is 
released 
 




















































Mean =*** 0.0046  
Median = ** 0.0021 
Minimum =  0.0063 
Maximum = 0.5127 
Percentage Negative = ***55.24  
 
 
Mean =*** 0.0067  
Median = * 0.0038 
Minimum =  0.5582 
Maximum = 0.2733 
Percentage Negative = ***56.28  
 
 
Mean =* 0.0021  
Median = * 0.0022 
Minimum =  0.7422 
Maximum = 0.3073 
Percentage Negative = **53.18  
 
Mean = *** 0.0054  
Median = * 0.0043 
Minimum = 0.6992 
Maximum = 0.5756 
Percentage Negative = ***55.93  
 
Mean = * 0.0023  
Median =  0.0017 
Minimum =  0.7065 
Maximum = 0.5381 
Percentage Negative = 52.33 
 
 Mean = * 0.0519  
Median = * 0.0513 
Minimum =  0.9061 
Maximum = 0.9372 
Percentage Negative = ***54.87 
 
See Table 2 for variable definitions.  † Since the Powers Report was released on 2/2/2002 
(Saturday), the event date is 2/4/2002;  ‡ return for ( 1, 1) window; * significant at 10% 
level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.     25
 
TABLE 4 
Firm Characteristics by Timing of Switch 
 
Variables 
Mean Value  Expected Sign  t Statistics
H0: (Early=Late) Early Switchers 
(PERIOD2 = 0) 
Late Switchers 
(PERIOD2 = 1) 
DELAY  86.0920  150.8700     *** 32.94
LMV  5.5246  4.2257  ?  ***7.36
INDSPL  0.1174  0.1401     *** 2.74
NONAUDIT  0.3687  0.4492     *** 4.16
DTENURE  0.6102  0.6568     * 1.30
ADACCR  0.0956  0.1074      0.78
DISTRESS  0.2698  0.2797      0.30
PREVCAR1   0.0054   0.0030      1.09
PREVCAR2   0.0084   0.0032     * 1.46
SEPARATECHAIR  0.6412  0.5805  +  **1.67
BDIR  8.1949  6.7458  +  ***6.91
ACDIR  3.4873  3.1059  +  ***4.67
BMEET  6.9040  5.8771  +  ***3.65
ACMEET  4.2175  3.5636  +  ***4.20
EXPERT  1.2885  1.2034  +  1.05
DFYR  0.6610  0.6992     * 1.28
ROA   0.0650   0.1130  ?  *1.70
DNEWB4  0.7331  0.7853  ?  * 1.66
 
See Table 2 for variable definitions.  * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% 
level; *** significant at 1% level. (one tailed significance levels where signs are 
predicted, two tailed otherwise).   26
TABLE 5 























































































































INDSPL  0.1119         
NONAUDIT  0.3955  0.1056       
DTENURE  0.3189  0.1713  0.1684      
ADACCR  -0.0463  0.1541  -0.0005 -0.0043      
DISTRESS  -0.0230  0.4519  0.0437 0.0589 0.0458      
PREVCAR1  -0.0325 -0.0318  -0.0483 -0.0247 -0.0413 -0.0508     
PREVCAR2  0.0885 -0.0482  0.0570 0.1013 -0.0159 -0.0825  -0.0092    
SEPARATECHAIR  0.1091  0.0620  0.0589 0.0551 0.0077 -0.0044  0.0056 0.0425   
BDIR  0.3539  0.0633  0.2439 0.1676 -0.0782 0.0458  -0.0355 0.0379  0.1057  
ACDIR  0.2772  0.0667  0.2220 0.1753 -0.0673 0.0309  0.0002 0.0306  0.1543 0.2454  
BMEET  0.0343  0.0244  0.1886 -0.0290 -0.0062 0.0787  -0.0188 -0.0642  0.0043 0.2287 0.2549  
ACMEET  0.1962  0.0342  0.1814 0.0225 -0.0130 0.0001  0.0139 -0.0144 -0.0073 0.2784 0.2568 0.2610  
EXPERT  -0.0056 -0.0225  0.0536 -0.1344 0.0624 -0.0059  -0.0081 0.0409  0.0158 0.1267 0.1437 0.0135 0.1182  
DFYR  0.3306  0.0297  0.1515 0.0801 0.0368 0.0490  -0.0229 0.0215  0.0033 0.1246 0.1107 0.0402 0.0170 0.0111 
ROA  0.1128  0.0283  0.0532 0.1658 -0.3720 -0.0187  0.0154 -0.0378  0.0418 0.0967 0.0431 -0.0941 -0.0185 -0.0818 -0.0831
DNEWB4  0.1977  0.1649  0.2439 0.2626 -0.0217 0.0314  -0.0431 0.0475  0.0188 -0.0106 -0.0017 -0.0977 0.0757 0.0108  0.1944 0.0761
 
See Table 2 for variable definitions.   27
TABLE 6 









Type of Procedure 








DELAY  PERIOD2  PERIOD3 
 
PERIOD3 
Log(p1/p3)  Log(p2/p3) 
Intercept2        ***1.3179     
Intercept1    ***146.524  ***2.0123  ***3.931  *** 2.5217  *** 1.4957 
LMV  +/   *** 5.9285  *** 0.3660  *** 0.3568  ***0.4086  ***0.1903 
INDSPL  +  **16.5312  **2.2453  *1.1209  *1.7577  **1.9035 
NONAUDIT  +  **6.5654  0.1502  0.1440   0.1605  0.2285 
DTENURE  +  ***6.3257  *0.0757  ***0.3952   0.2842  0.1855 
ADACCR  +  **11.1533  **1.3353  *0.6108  0.3113  0.6943 
DISTRESS  +  **5.0029  ***0.5588  **0.3063   0.2607   0.3021 
PREVCAR1  +  13.0165  1.7499  0.6984  0.4029  1.1322 
PREVCAR2  +  ***33.4788  ***3.4866  ***2.7258   1.8637   1.7401 
SEPARATECHAIR     * 2.2507  * 0.2725  * 0.2011  0.1178  0.07 
BDIR     *** 2.3483  *** 0.1787  *** 0.142  ***0.1761  **0.1135 
ACDIR      0.9932   0.0728  * 0.1263   0.0419   0.1086 
BMEET     * 0.4160  ** 0.0656  * 0.0277  0.0497  **0.0695 
ACMEET     *** 2.1980  ** 0.0997  *** 0.1298  *0.0896  0.0054 
EXPERT     * 1.0785  * 0.1644   0.0767  0.0193  0.0932 
DFYR  +  ***12.1664  ***0.9252  ***0.8654  ***0.9521  ***0.5555 
ROA  +/   ** 4.7629  * 0.4252   0.2134   0.0216  0.3624 
DNEWB4  +/   ***13.9315  ***0.9772  ***0.8643   0.6926   0.0656 
Observations 
Adj R Square 
F Value 






























See Table 2 for variable definitions.  
 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. (one 
tailed significance levels where signs are predicted, two tailed otherwise) 
† We do not have any predictions for signs in this analysis.   28
TABLE 7 
Market Reaction around Disclosure of Auditor Change  
 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis 
 




Mean =*0.0051  
Median =*0.0024  
Percentage Positive=*52.12  
 




Sign  Estimate   t Stat 
Intercept     0.0020   0.31 
LMV  +/    0.0001   0.11 
INDSPL  +  0.0089  0.60 
NONAUDIT  +   0.0035   0.56 
DTENURE  +  *0.0047  1.44 
ADACCR  +  *0.0042  1.49 
DISTRESS  +   0.0019   0.53 
PREVCAR1     0.0064  0.29 
PREVCAR2     *** 0.0559   2.62 
SEPARATECHAIR     0.0027  0.91 
BDIR     0.0002  0.23 
ACDIR     0.0010  0.55 
BMEET     * 0.0006   1.33 
ACMEET     0.0008  1.14 
EXPERT     ** 0.0029   1.96 
DFYR  +/   *0.0055  1.70 
ROA  +/   *** 0.0152   2.88 
DNEWB4  +/    0.0041   0.95 
Observations 
Adj R Sqr 
F Value 
Prob > F 
  937 
0.0164 
1.8300 
0.0214   
 
See Table 2 for variable definitions 
* significant at 10% level; **  significant at 5% level; ***  significant at 1% level (one 
tailed significance levels where signs are predicted, two tailed otherwise) 
 